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Consumer Picketing and the
Court- The Questionable
Yield of Tree Fruits
The actual effect upon the parties of some decisions by
the Supreme Court may be of relative insignificance
when compared with the impact of these decisions upon
the judicial process itself. The following article discusses
one recent decision of this nature, the Tree Fruits case,
which dealt with the judicial interpretation of the
amended "consumer picketing" provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Professor Lewis characterizes the decision as one probably having no major
impact upon labor-management relations, but criticizes
the Court's decision making process. The author considers the general function of legislative history in the
process of statutory construction and various rules of
interpretation, along with the specific history of the
provisions in question, which conceivably could explain the Court's decision. However, he concludes that
the Court avoided significant factors in this case by a
vague reference to the first amendment and rendered an
opinion based on reasoning which was inadequate to
support the result reached.

Thomas P. Lewis*
Many Supreme Court decisions are more interesting - and
important - as specimens for the study of the judicial process
than as resolutions of particular disputes. One such case, decided
last term, is NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760
[Tree Fruits].? The issue was a narrow one - whether so-called
"consumer picketing," limited to an appeal to the public concerning the products of an employer with whom the union has a
primary dispute, is prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act [NLRA], as amended. That section makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization "to
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. (Professor of Law, University

of Minnesota beginning Fall, 1965.)
1. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . .
where . . . an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring any person
to ... cease doing business with any other person . . . ." A proviso

qualifying this section states that nothing in paragraph four "shall
be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers
and members of a labor organization, that a product or products
are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization
has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer
"2

The factual context in which the issue was presented provided
maximum sympathy for the union viewpoint that some form of
consumer picketing should be permitted. Respondent, Local 760,
represented employees of fruit packers and warehousemen doing
business in Yakima, Washington, who were represented for collective bargaining purposes by the Tree Fruits Labor Relations
Committee, Inc. During the negotiations for a new contract, Local
760 called a strike against the employers. Within a week the
majority of the plants, with the assistance of nonstriking personnel and replacements, resumed full operation.' After some three
months of unsuccessful striking, the union decided to appeal to
the public not to buy apples packed by non-union, strike-breaking
workers. The plan was carried out by placing pickets at 46 Safeway stores in-Seattle. The pickets wore placards and distributed
handbills appealing to customers not to buy Washington State
apples. The pickets appeared at and left the stores shortly after
the beginning and before the end of the workday, restricted their
activity to customer entrances, and were instructed not to inter-

fere with the work of Safeway employees and not to request customers to refuse to patronize the stores. The union notified the
store managers of their limited purpose to appeal to customers
and promised corrective action immediately if any store employees stopped work or if deliveries to the stores were impeded.
No work stoppages or refusals to deliver occurred.
The National Labor Relations Board received the case directly
on the basis of stipulated facts and a complaint charging that
the union's conduct violated section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B). No
evidence or stipulation concerning actual effects of the picketing
on Safeway's sales generally or on sales of Washington State
2. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (Supp. V, 1964). (Emphasis added.)
3. Brief for Respondents, p. 34, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers,
Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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apples was produced. The Board dismissed the 8(b) (4) (i) charge,
holding that any intention by the union to induce Safeway employees to engage in work stoppage was lacking. But the second
charge was upheld, the Board holding that " 'by literal wording
of the proviso [to section 8(b)(4)] as well as through the interpretive gloss placed thereon by its drafters, consumer picketing in
front of a secondary establishment is prohibited."' The picketing
"'threaten[s], coerce[s], or restrain[s]' persons within the meaning
of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)," the Board said, and since the "natural
and foreseeable result of such picketing, if successful, would be to
force or require Safeway to reduce or to discontinue altogether its
purchases of such apples from the struck employers" it is reasonable to infer that the union intended the forbidden object.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
the Board and remanded the case. Believing a substantial first
amendment speech-regulation problem existed, that court found
a more "plausible reading to be that § 8(b)(4)(ii) outlaws only
such conduct (including picketing) as in fact threatens, coerces
or restrains secondary employers. . . ."" Since there was no evi-

dence or finding that Safeway in fact felt any coercion or restraint
(through substantial economic impact, for example), section 8(b)
(4) (ii) was not applicable.
While rejecting the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the
section, a majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Brennan, held that there was no violation of section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B) on the facts. In reaching this result, the Court disagreed with most leading commentators who have discussed the
question," strained the arguably "plain meaning" of the section
coupled with its proviso, and overcame a legislative history which
seemingly compelled a contrary conclusion. The only justification
given for hurdling those substantial obstacles was shrouded in
4. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 132 N.L.R.B. 1179, 1177-78
(1961).
5. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 808 Fed 811, 815
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 78 HAny. L. REv. 1086, 1114 (1960); Cox, The Landrum-Grifjin Amendments to the NationalLabor Relations Act, 44 Marw. L. REv. 257, 274 (1959);
Farmer, The Status and Application of the Secondary-Boycott and HotCargo Provisions, 48 GEo. LJ. 827, 881, 841 (1959); Ryan, Recognition,
Organizationaland Consumer Picketing, 48 GEo. LJ. 359, 869-70 (1959); of.
Fleming, Title VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 666,
688-98 (1960). But see Previant, The New Hot-Cargo and Secondary-Boycott
Sections: A Critical Analysis, 48 GEo. L.J. 846, 852-54 (1959) (Mr. Previant
was counsel for Respondent in the principal case.)
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the mists of a vague reference to the first amendment to the Constitution.7 Mr. Justice Brennan acknowledged the governing
statutory language by quoting it in his opening sentence and
stating the issue to be whether all secondary consumer picketing
coerces or restrains the secondary employer within the meaning of
section 8(b) (4) (ii); but from that point on, his analysis proceeds
as if the statute were adequate only to present the legal question
- as if it could have nothing to contribute towards answering it.
This is accounted for by a rule of statutory construction announced by Mr. Justice Brennan at the beginning of his analysis.
The rule and the reasons given for it are reflected in this language
from the opinion:
Throughout the history of federal regulation of labor relations, Congress has consistently refused to prohibit peaceful picketing except
where it is used as a means to achieve specific ends which experience
has shown are undesirable. "In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing
Congress has dealt explicitly with isolated evils which experience has
established flow from such picketing." . . . We have recognized this
congressional practice and -have not ascribed to Congress a purpose to
outlaw peaceful picketing unless "there is the clearest indication in the
legislative history," . . . that Congress intended to do so as regards the
particular ends of the picketing under review. Both the congressional
policy and our adherence to this principle of interpretation reflect concern that a broad iban against peaceful picketing might collide with the
guarantees of the First Amendment.8

The conclusion the Court reached on the basis of the above test
was then stated prior to the description of the application:
We have examined the legislative history of the amendments to
8(b)(4), and conclude that it does not reflect with the requisite
clarity a congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, and, particularly, any concern with peaceful
picketing when it is limited, as here, -to persuading Safeway customers
not to buy Washington State apples when they traded in the Safeway
Stores.9

4

What was Congress concerned with when it enacted 8(b) (4)

(ii) (B) and the elaborate proviso? According to the Court, Congress meant to reach only that peaceful consumer picketing de7. Mr. Justice Black concurred in the judgment of the Court, but on the
ground that & 8(b)(4)(ii), construed to apply to the facts of the case as "it
must be," violates the first amendment. 877 U.S. at 76. Mr. Justice Douglas
did not participate in the decision of the case. Justices Harlan and Stewart
dissented on the ground that the statutory language and legislative history
of § 8(b)(4)(ii) leave "no escape from the conclusion that . . . all consumer
picketing" is forbidden. Id. at 92.
8. Id. at 69-63. i(Emphasis added and citation omitted.)
9. Id. at 63. (Emphasis added.)
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signed to shut off all trade with the secondary employer unless
he aids the union in its dispute with the primary employer.
Relating the problem to the conceptual terms of the statute, the
Court held that publicity, whether by picketing or otherwise,
which appeals to the consumer not to buy the product of the
primary employer, does not "coerce or restrain" the secondary
employer; whereas publicity appealing to consumers not to
trade at all with a secondary employer who sells a product of
the primary employer does coerce and restrain the secondary
employer. The proviso saves this latter type of publicity, however, so long as it is not communicated through "picketing."
This disposition of the case raises three fundamental questions:
1) Was the Court justified in focusing its attention solely on the
legislative history? 2) Was the Court justified in demanding a
clearer expression of meaning than it found in the legislative
materials? 3) What is the relevance, if any, of a finding of support
or lack of support in the legislative materials for the interpretation selected by the Court? Each of the questions will be considered in the light of relevant general principles. The legislative
history of section 8(b) (4) (ii) will then be set forth so that general
conclusions can be tested against the concrete materials which
were before the Court.
I. THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The increasing role of legislative history in the Supreme Court's
task of interpreting statutes, Mr. Justice Jackson's protests notwithstanding,o is well known. Equally well established, however,
is the fact that legislation, not legislative history, is passed by
the Congress and approved or vetoed by the President. We know
that legislation cannot be ignored because it lacks a helpful and
explanatory history, and conversely, that legislative history not
culminating in enacted legislation cannot be enforced as legislation in the conventional sense. These facts in no way detract
from today's widespread agreement on the wisdom of using legislative history as an aid in interpreting legislation. It might be
argued in a few instances that if plain statutory language seems
to admit of but one solution, interpretation is ended; legislative
10. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395
(1951) (concurring opinion); Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535 (1948). The use and

abuse of legislative history and Mr. Justice Jackson's admonitions are perceptively treated in Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1Q43-86 (Tentative ed. 1958).
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history can have no function. But words being the inexact symbols
that they are, and the power being in a legislature to define even
so-called "single-meaning" words, no means may be available for
determining intelligently that certain language has or was intended to convey a plain meaning except study of extrinsic aids,
including legislative history." Even an invariable rule of resort
to legislative history, however, will not alter the fact that the
purpose of the resort is to find out what relevant legislation
means. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has written, "spurious use
of legislative history must not swallow the legislation so as to give
point to the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful
do you go to the statute. While courts are no longer confined
to the language, they are still confined by it.""
It follows from these observations that statutory interpretation
should begin with consideration of the statutory language.' The
Court in Tree Fruits literally departed from this principle and
seemed to provide an independent function for legislative history
to which it is not entitled. It relied for its approach on NLRB v.
Drivers Union [Curtis Bros.].' In analyzing the Court's methodology in light of the concrete problem before it, rather than
against the foregoing abstractions, a comparison of Tree Fruits
with Curtis Bros. will be useful.
In CurtisBros. the Board had found,' 5 10 years after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, that peaceful recognition picketing
coerces or restrains employees in the exercise of their rights under
section 7 of the NLRA'8 in violation of section 8(b)(1) of the
NLRA.-7 The Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation,
and found that Congress did not intend to regulate peaceful picketing by the general language of 8(b) (1), which forbids a labor
organization to "coerce or restrain" (but not to "interfere with")
an employee's rights. The Court noted the linkage between the
prohibition by the Board and the right to strike, protected by
section 13 of the NLRA against restriction, "unless 'specifically
provided for' in the Act" and read this as a caution "against an
expansive reading" of the general language in 8(b) (1). The Court
11. See Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 94 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein, 85 S. Ct. 300 (1964).
12. Frankfurter, Some Reftections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLuM.
L. REV. 527, 543 (1947).
13. Id. at 535; Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1285.
14. 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
15. Drivers Local 639, 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).

16. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
17. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.

4 157 (1958).
&158(b)(1) (1958).
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mentioned the sensitiveness of peaceful picketing as an area of
regulation, pointed out the congressional approach of dealing
with isolated evils (citing section 8(b) (4) "as illustrative of the
congressional practice"), and concluded that it could uphold the
Board only if the "congressional purpose ... persuasively appears
8 As the Court
either from the structure or history of the statute.""
pointed out in this case, tension existed between two categories
of employee rights protected from coercion or restraint by section
7 - rights to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activities, and rights to refrain from these activities. General statutory language is not well suited to the task of relieving
this tension. Just as the Court has had to avoid a literal interpretation of section 8(a)(1)'9 and to consider legitimate employer
interests to determine which of his activities interfere with section
7 rights,s0 so the Court had to consider competing employee interests to determine the meaning of section 8(b) (1). The structure
of the legislation created doubt. The Board recognized that organizational picketing was not condemned by the NLRA but
perhaps failed to face up to the difficulty of distinguishing between it and recognitional picketings' Tradition, a history of
contrary legislative interpretation, and the very great importance
attached to recognition picketing increased doubt. Finally, by
the time the case reached its conclusion, Congress had isolated
the evils it wanted to regulate by amending the NLRA to include
section 8(b)(7) ' indicating in the legislative history that this
was to be the exclusive accommodation of conflicting interests?"
Upholding the Board's ruling would create an additional source
of regulation, possibly in conflict with 8(b) (7). In the face of these
considerations, the demand for a persuasive legislative history
indicating a congressional intention to forbid recognition picketing in 8(b) (1) is understandable.
The problem of statutory interpretation presented by Tree
Fruits was fundamentally different from that presented by Curtis
Bros. First, the statutory section contains specific language obviously addressed to the specific dispute in Tree Fruits.The proviso
excepting publicity, other than picketing, from the general language of 8(b)(4)(ii) indicates the probability that all forms of
consumer boycott publicity were thought to be included in the
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

362 U.S. at 281-84. (Emphasis added.)
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. j 158(a)(1) (1958).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 851 U.S. 105 (1956).
See Paint, Varnish & Lacquer Makers Union, 120 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1958).
73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (Supp. V, 1964).
See Cox, supra note 6, at 268-69.
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meaning of the general language as a form of coercion or restraint.
Interpreted most narrowly, the words definitely point to the
inclusion of some picketing. But inclusion of less than all creates
the problem of defining that picketing which is to be included.
The statutory language provides no hint as to the means of differentiating between the permitted and prohibited. One possibility is the distinction made by the Court of Appeals in Tree
Fruit 2 4 But this distinction turns the results on the success of
the picketing, a criterion structurally out of joint with other parts
of 8(b)(4)?"5 In addition difficult problems of proof would be
created by such a distinction in cases of actual picketing and
nearly impossible ones created in cases of "threats" which are also
prohibited by 8(b) (4) (ii)?6
Another possible criterion for distinction is the purpose of the
picketing labor organization. Did it merely intend to reduce sales
of a struck product to consumers, or was its purpose to force a
cessation of business relations between the primary and secondary
employers? The latter purpose is necessary to bring the conduct
within the language of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), but the reality of the distinction is highly questionable? 7 It is noteworthy that neither
the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court questioned the
Board's finding of forbidden purpose in Tree Fruits.
Finally, the Court drew the distinction between "do not buy
the product" and "do not trade" appeals. This distinction clearly
has merit which could appeal to a decision-maker for whom the
problem is res integra. As the Court pointed out in its opinion,
the distinction has secured some recognition in early state court
decisions and labor law treatises? The question is, did Congress
intend to create the distinction. Nothing in the statutory language points in that direction unless past interpretation of the
words "coerce or restrain" provides direction. The Court referred
24. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
25. This point -as well as the point that the words "coerce or restrain" in
t§ 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1), as construed, do not require proof of actual effect-is
developed with citation of many precedents in the Brief for Petitioner, pp.
10-13, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
26. See Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1963).
27. The distinction is stated as a possibility, but without any apparent
enthusiasm for its validity, in Farmer, supra, note 6, at 841 n.73.
28. 377 U.S. at 63-64, citing, inter alia, Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y.
LABoR DisPuTEs Am CoLTEcTIV
281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937), and 1 TEILER,
BARGAINING § 123 (1940). The author of a 1938 article on the subject noted
that case authority on the point outside of New York is extremely sparse.
Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YArE LJ. 341, 349
(1938).
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to no such past interpretation. 9 Generally speaking, a "do not
trade" appeal should have a more coercive effect on a secondary
employer, but as Mr. Justice Harlan observed in his dissent, real
effects will depend on the nature and number of products sold
by the secondary employer. Apart from this distinction, degrees
of coercive effect are not recognized in the statutory language.
In an initial consideration of possible interpretations of the
statute, the statutory structure should also be considered. The
proviso which exempts publicity, other than picketing, is effective
only so long as "such publicity does not have an effect of inducing" work refusals at the secondary employer's establishment.
The Court's interpretation gives to the proviso the function
merely of saving publicity other than picketing which makes a
"do not trade" appeal.s0 Since this publicity in turn is prohibited
by the terms of the proviso if an effect is to induce work stoppages at the secondary site, the purpose attributed to Congress
is to turn the application of the work-stoppage qualification on
the type of message conveyed at the secondary site even though
in all cases the message will be addressed solely to consumers.
If Congress was at all concerned with the possibility that consumer boycotts might spread to employees, it is at least questionable whether its concern would be made to depend in live cases
upon a factor so sterile and mechanical (in the context of proved
work stoppages) as the content of the message to consumers.!'
29. The Court did argue that the express prohibition of picketing in $
8(b)(7) means that Congress makes its meaning clear when intending to bar
picketing per se. Of course, picketing to effectuate a "do not trade" appeal
is per se prohibited under the Court's rule in just the same sense that
picketing to effectuate a "do not buy the product" appeal would be under
the Board's rule.
80. But the Court in NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964), decided
the same day as Tree Fruits, specifically ruled that a wholesaler of goods is
a "producer" within the meaning of the publicity proviso to § 8(b)(4). Since
the handbilling in question in the case appealed to customers to refrain from
buying named products distributed by the wholesaler-hence was not "coercive" according to Tree Fruits- the coverage of the publicity proviso should
not have been an issue.
31. If the occurrences of work stoppages alone were sufficient to convert
a boycott of products at a secondary establishment into a § 8(b)(4)(i) type
of boycott, the problem discussed in the text would disappear. The language
of § 8(b)(4)(i), "to induce or encourage," is closely similar to the language of
the proviso, "have an effect of inducing," but the Board has stressed in
8(b)(4)(i) cases the necessity of finding conduct intended, calculated, or likely
to result in work stoppages. Secondary picketing is not per se inducement
or encouragement within the meaning of 8(b)(4)(i). See, e.g., Fruit & Vegetable
Packers, Local 760, 182 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961); Upholsterers, Twin City Local
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Moreover, the very existence of this problem provided added
dimension to the difference between the Court's and the NLRB's
interpretations of the section. If the Court's interpretation is correct, some accounting for the curious structure of the section
might reasonably be searched for in the legislative history.
These are some of the questions that might have been asked
prior to study of the legislative history. Without some analysis of
the statutory language, it is difficult to understand how flat statements rationally may be made about the demands to be made of
legislative history.32 Analysis of the language of the statute does
not, it is true, demonstrate a single correct interpretation. The
possibility that Congress used the words "coerce or restrain" in
a special sense remains after analysis of the language. But the
analysis does indicate that if a special meaning was intended,
support for it should appear in the legislative history. It should,
that is, unless a special rule of construction supplies the needed
support.
II. THE EMPHASIS ON CLEAR MEANING
In addition to its use of legislative history as if it were the
only source of meaning, the Court approached it with an artificial
emphasis: The interpretation rendered by the Board would be
upheld only if legislative history provided the clearest indication
that this was Congress' purpose. In choosing this emphasis, the
Court applied a "policy of clear statement" for which it shared
responsibility with Congress."
61, 132 NL.R.B. 40 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 381 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.
1964) (citing Tree Fruits). The contrary authority of Burr v. NLRB, 3821
F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963), has been diminished by the Supreme Court's disposition of Tree Fruits. See also United Wholesale & Warehouse Employees
Local 261 v. NLRB, 282 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1960). One can only speculate
as to the effect, if any, which Tree Fruits will have on the Board where work
stoppages actually occur, even though the union activity is restricted purely
to consumer appeals at consumer entrances. It could be said in one sense
that work stoppages having occurred, they were "likely" to occur, but it might
be difficult to find that the union sought the stoppages, or that they were
the natural and probable result of the picketing.
82. See Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1285.
3. The Court's statement of the policy is quoted in text accompanying
note 8 supra. Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1240, states the same
policy: "Judicial opinions on the interpretation of statutes are replete with
references to presumptions, or suggestions of the existence of presumptions,
amounting to what are here called policies of clear statement. In effect, these
presumptions all say to the legislature, 'If you mean this, you must say so
plainly."
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This policy of clear statement applied is probably a composite
of several well-established policies, the most nearly analogous one
being the practice of construing legislation to avoid constitutional
questions. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided."3 4 The key words are "serious
doubt" and "fairly possible." Is it enough that the words of a
statute will bear more than one interpretation, one of which will
raise a serious question of constitutional law and one of which
will avoid the question? The rule has been stated in terms almost
this extreme." This application of the rule would represent an
inflexible conclusion that the purposes unmistakably sought by
Congress are always of less importance than the avoidance of
constitutional issues, and would lead in many cases to absurd results.3 The next most extreme statement of the rule takes this
form: "We should not attribute to Congress such a purpose or
intent unless it used language so mandatory and unmistakable
that it left no alternative . .. ."- This statement leaves room for
the accommodation of legislative purpose if clearly enough stated.
Set off against these statements of the rule are the more frequent
statements which would invoke it where legislation is "reasonably
susceptible" to the innocent interpretation, or where the legislation is "equally susceptible" to two interpretations."
Then there is the rule of construction of opposite thrust which
34. This is the one sentence summary of the policy selected by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932), for inclusion in
his much-cited concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936). See generally Note, Supreme Court Interpreta-

tion of Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53 Cowum. L. REV. 633

(1953).
35. "The Court makes a drastic break with the past in disregard of the
settled principle of constitutional adjudication not to pass on a constitutional
issue-and here a grave one involving basic civil liberties-if a construction that does no violence to the English language permits its avoidance."
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 36 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not apply the rule in this literally extreme form.
s6. For example, consider the possible results if the rule in this form had
been applied to the issues presented in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 85 Sup. Ct. 377 (1964).
37. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 71 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
38. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 76 (1932) ("equally susceptible")
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 407 (1909) ("reasonably susceptible").
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emphasizes legislative purpose as the most important value:
For, in construing statutory immunities in such circumstances, we must
heed the equally well-settled doctrine of this Court to read a statute,
assuming that it is susceptible of either of two opposed interpretations,
in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of the legislative draftsmen. The canon of avoidance of constitutional doubts must, like the "plain meaning" rule, give way where its
application would produce a futile result, or an unreasonable result
"plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.'"

Each of these statements is capable of valid applications.
While it would create absurd results if the evident purposes of
Congress were ignored blindly in the name of self-restraint, it
would create equally absurd results if the apparent purposes
of Congress were inexorably found in its legislation even though
these purposes would lead to the destruction of entire legislative
enactments as unconstitutional. The nature and gravity of the
constitutional issue must be accounted for in the formulation of
the canon. If it is reasonably evident that one interpretation will
render a statute unconstitutional on its face or as applied, this
may be a powerful argument for a narrower interpretation.o
Knowledge of a constitutional issue may be used as a reason for
attributing certain meanings to Congress in the use of language.4 '
Beyond this usage, as the border between the constitutional and
unconstitutional is approached, there legitimately may be less
concern with giving effect to the expressed will of the legislature,
for that branch might prefer in the circumstances to have some
legislation on the subject rather than none at all. In these cases,
of course, the more the Constitution determines the meaning of
legislation, the less possible it becomes to avoid the constitutional
issue.4
At the opposite extreme is the case in which the congressional
purpose is clear, the constitutional issue is of doubtful validity
at best, and the alternative interpretation is one which would
seriously undermine the legislative purpose. Use of the canon in
these circumstances is merely a disguise for a result reached on
89. Shapiro v. United States, 835 U.S. 1, 31 (1948); accord, Hopkins Fed.
Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 384-35 (1935) (Cardozo, J.).
40. See, e.g., United States v. CIO, 35 U.S. 106 (1948); Ruddy v. Rossi,
248 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting); The Abby Dodge, 228
U.S. 166 (1912).
41. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 889 U.S. 882 (1950).
42. The obscenity cases illustrate the extreme application of this general
statement.
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the basis of other considerations. Whether a given case falls at
one extreme or the other or somewhere between the extremes
can be determined only by considering the legislation, its legislative history, and the nature of the constitutional issue potentially
involved. Application of the canon in any event cannot justify
reliance upon an examination of legislative history alone.
In Tree Fruits, the Court did not precisely invoke the canon
that legislation should be interpreted so as to avoid a constitutional question. Nowhere in the majority opinion is it claimed
that the NLRB's interpretation raises a serious constitutional
question; rather, the claim is made that a "broad ban" against
peaceful picketing might violate the Constitution, without any
conclusion that 8(b) (4) (ii) in any of its possible meanings constitutes a "broad ban" in the sense used. Bans on peaceful picketing
as broad or broader, and surely more severe in their effects, have
been upheld by the Court in recent cases.44
No further hint is given as to the Constitution's role in the
case. The impression is easily gained that the Constitution contributed to the defeat of one possible interpretation of the statute,
and that the interpretation adopted somehow accounts for any
constitutional doubts, but these ideas never receive clear expression.
The important point may be one mentioned by the Court that
an appeal concerning only the primary employer's product partakes of a primary dispute even though it occurs at the site of
the secondary employer's business. A Congress believing this factor to be important in weighing competing interests might distinguish between "product" and "do not trade" picketing. It
might also distinguish between picketing and other publicity, for
it is apparent that an important value of a "do not buy the product" picket line, as distinguished from mere publicity, is the
potential power the picket line has as a symbol to turn customers
43. In an opinion in which he invoked the canon, Mr. Justice Holmes
asserted that its use to bolster a conclusion reached on other grounds was
the more common usage. Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1918).
44. See, e.g., Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (recognition picketing). The Vogt case contains a summary of other recent cases
in which state regulation of picketing was upheld. See generally Farmer &
Williamson, Picketing and the Injunctive Power of State Courts-From
Thornhill to Vogt, 35 U. DET. LJ. 431 (1958). While Mr. Justice Black concurred in the judgment of the Court in Tree Fruits on constitutional grounds,
his analysis is broad enough to invalidate either of the major interpretations
of § 8(b)(4)(ii) discussed herein.
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away from any trade with the picketed establishment.'- A picket
line limited to the purpose of advising persons who are implicitly
invited to cross it not to buy a particular product within the
picketed establishment is a concept embodying internal inconsistency. This fact hardly means that Congress would not choose
to preserve a traditional means of communication, but does suggest that a choice to condemn it in this very limited context,
even though considered by many to be unnecessarily harsh, is
not irrational and arbitrary. Also the suggestion is possible that
a Congress mindful of the Constitution might have chosen precisely the rule which the Board found clearly stated in section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B), i.e., a rule which protects lines of information concerning a labor dispute and involved products, but which attempts
to excise the one element that may have an extra-informational
effect.
Another basis for the policy of clear statement, closely related
to the one derived from a desire to avoid constitutional issues, is
one derived from the value of protecting important interests from
lightly undertaken legislative destruction. Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall provided an early announcement of this policy:
To interfere with the penal laws of a State . . . is a very serious
measure, which Congress cannot be supposed to adopt lightly, or inconsiderately....
An act, such as that under consideration, ought not, we think, to be
so construed as to imply this intention, unless its provisions were such
as to render the construction inevitable.40

The interest regarded as important enough to support a policy
of clear statement may or may not be of constitutional proportions.4 7 The interest in picketing generally, and in the specific
goals for which it is a means, is surely a highly important one.
Apart from the constitutional protection it might receive, the
right to engage in peaceful picketing should not be subjected to
regulation by inference from loosely drawn legislation. This idea
probably explains the Court's insistence on clear expression by
45. The words of the proviso will bear an even narrower interpretation
combining both of the mentioned distinctions. NLRB General Counsel contended that only publicity urging a product boycott is permitted by the proviso. The NLRB rejected this interpretation and held that "do not trade"
publicity is permitted. Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs, 133 N.L.R.B.
1698 (1961). The legislative history recounted in the text accompanying notes
49-77 infra reflects substantial support for the Board's position.
46. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 443 (1821).
47. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); United Constr. Workers
v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). Another example is the
Curtis Bros. case discussed in the text accompany notes 14-23 supra.
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Congress more adequately than the interest in avoiding a constitutional issue. However, reliance upon legislative history alone
as the source of clarity or ambiguity is not thus explained. And,
unlike a constitutional issue, an important interest can serve
only as the predicate for a demand for clarity; it cannot doctrinally limit the power of Congress and in this way inject its own
meaning into legislation. Thus the legislative meaning, if expressed with sufficient clarity, should dominate in the process of
interpretation. In judging the clarity of expression in section
8(b)(4)(ii), its legislative history must be considered.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RELEVANT TO
TREE FRUITS
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act" was
a compromise between the Kennedy-Ervin bill,49 adopted by the
Senate, and the Landrum-Griffin bill," adopted by the House, in
the 86th Congress. The Kennedy-Ervin bill contained no
amendments to the NIRA secondary boycott provisions, but
Landrum-Griffin, and the Administration bill" introduced in the
Senate by Senator Goldwater, contained amendments designed
to close certain "loopholes" in section 8(b) (4) of the NLRA. One
of these loopholes was the failure of section 8(b) (4) to reach direct
pressures exerted against a secondary employer with an object
of forcing him to cease doing business with the primary employer.
The language of section 8(b)(4)(ii) was designed to close this
loophole and was contained in the portions of Landrum-Griffin
and the Administration bill amending the NLRA.
Specific types of "coercion" of secondary employers were not
initially explained in any detail by the sponsors of the legislation.
Emphasis was placed on the object for which coercion was practiced -

cessation of business between employers - rather than

on means." But in early criticism of a Goldwater amendment to
the Kennedy-Ervin bill similar to section 8(b)(4)(ii), Senator
Humphrey said he feared that appeals to consumers through
handbills or picketing to stop buying a primary employer's prod48. 78 Stat. 519 (1959), 99 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V. 1964).
49. 8. 1555, 86th Cong., Ist Sess (1959).
50. H.R. 8342, as amended, 86th Cong., lst Sess. (1959).
51. S. 748, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
52. It is clear that prohibiting the consumer boycott was an object of
those who sought to close "loopholes." Senators Goldwater and Dirksen
criticized the omission of any provision aimed at the problem in S. 1555 when
it was favorably reported from committee. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 79 (1959) (minority views).
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uct or to stop patronizing the secondary employer would be outlawed." Congressman Griffin initially explained this portion of
his bill simply as prohibiting a union official's going to B and
threatening "him with labor trouble or other consequences, unless
he stops dealing with company A. . . ."14 He became more specific

under questioning from Congressman Brown:
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I should like to propound a
question either to Mr. GRIFEIN or to Mr. LANDRUM, the authors of
one of the bills, relative to secondary boycotts....
My question concerns the picketing of customer entrances to retail
stores selling goods manufactured by a concern under strike. Would
that situation be prohibited under the gentleman's bill?
Mr. GRIFFIN. Let us take for example the case that the President
talked about in his recent radio address. A few newspapers reported
that the secondary boycott described by the President would be prohibited under the present act. It will be recalled that the case involved
a dispute with a company that manufactured furniture. Let us understand that we are not considering, as I understand your question, the
right to picket at the manufacturing plant where the dispute exists.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. That is right. We are looking only at the
problem of picketing at a retail store where the furniture is sold.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Then, we are not talking about picketing at the
place of the primary dispute. We are concerned about picketing at a
store where the furniture is sold. Under the present law, if the picketing
happens to 'be at the employee entrance so that clearly the purpose of
the picketing is to induce the employees of the secondary employer
not to handle the products of the primary employer, the boycott could
be enjoined.
However, if the picketing happened to be around at the customer
entrance, and if the purpose of the picketing were to coerce the employer not to handle those goods, then under the present law, because
of technical interpretations, the boycott would not be covered.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. In other words, the Taft-Hartley Act does
not cover such a situation now?
Mr. GRIFFIN. The way it has been interpreted.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. But the Grififn-Landrum bill would?
Mr. GRIFFIN. Our bill would; that is right. If the purpose of the
picketing is to coerce or to restrain the employer of that second establishment, to get him not to do 'business with the manufacturer - then
such a boycott could be stopped.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Not to sell the goods of some concern that
is on strike. Would that same rule apply to the picketing at the customer entrances, for instance of plumbing shops, or newspapers that
might run the advertising of these concerns, or radio stations that might
carry their program?
53. 105 CONG. REc. 6232 (1959), 2 U.S. NLRB LEGIsIVA E HISTORY OF THE
LABoR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIBcLOSET
ACT OF 1959, at 1037 (1959).
(Hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.)
54. Id. at 15582, 2 LEG. HIST. 1568.
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Mr. GRIFFIN. Of course, this bill and any other bill is limited by
the constitutional right of free speech. If the purpose of the picketing
is to coerce the retailer not to do business with the manufacturer,
whether it is plumbing Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Advertising.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Advertising, or anything else, it would be covered
by our bill. It is not covered now.55

Congressmen Udall and Thompson were very specific in the
meaning they attached to the Landrum-Griffin amendment in a
formal analysis which they inserted in the record:
The bill provides that a union may not restrain an employer where
an object is to require him to cease doing business with any other
employer. The prohibition reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio
broadcasts, and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering with
freedom of speech.
Suppose that the employees of the Coors Brewery were to strike
for higher wages and -the company attempted to run the brewery with
strikebreakers. Under the present law, the union can ask the public not
to buy Coors beer during the strike. It can picket the bars and restaurants which -sold Coors beer with the signs asking the public not to buy
the product. It can broadcast the request over the radio or in newspaper advertisements.
The Landrum bill forbids this elementary freedom to appeal to the
general public for assistance in winning fair labor standards. The union
apparently could be enjoined upon the ground that it was coercing
or restraining the retailer with object of inducing him not to deal with
the brewery; indeed, as I understand it, one of the acknowledged purposes of the amendment is to prevent unions from appealing -to the
general public as consumers for assistance in a labor dispute.
This is a basic infringement upon freedom of expression."

The same illustration and objections were registered in an analysis of Landrum-Griffin prepared by the late Senator Kennedy
and Congressman Thompson, both conferees.7
The history of the proviso to section 8(b)(4) begins with a
resolution introduced in the Senate by Senator Kennedy seeking
instructions for the Senate conferees in their attempt to resolve
differences between the Landrum-Griffin and Kennedy-Ervin
bills. According to the proposed resolution, section 8(b) (4) (ii)
would remain, but a proviso worded as follows would be added:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed . . . to prohibit publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public (including consumers) that an establishment is operated, or
goods are produced or distributed, by an employer engaged in a labor
55. Id. at 15672-78, 2 LEG. HIST. 1615.
56. Id. at 15540, 2 Lu. IST. 1576.
57. Id. at 16591, 2 LEG. HIST. 1708.
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dispute, without inducing employees to refuse to pick up, deliver or
transport any goods, or perform any services at such establishment. ... 5

One of the ambiguities of this proviso is whether "publicity"
included picketing. The analysis submitted with the resolution
merely explained that "there is to be no prohibition on truthful
appeals to consumers not to patronize an establishment, or not
to buy goods, because the manufacturer is involved in a labor
dispute."" One point is clear: All publicity, whether an appeal
not to patronize or an appeal not to buy goods, was subject to
the limitation that it must not affect pick-ups and deliveries. An
earlier exchange between Senators Kennedy and Dirksen concerning the resolution sheds some light, but its meaning is not
perfectly clear:
Mr. DIRKSEN... . We got into a tizzy in the illustration used
about a mattress plant located, let us say, in Raleigh, N.C., which has
a very good customer in St. Louis, Mo. They have a labor dispute in
Raleigh, and the pickets show up at the customer's plant in St. Louis.
We spend a day discussing what shall appear on the signs. Can they
put something in the newspapers? Can they go on the radio?
Mr. KENNEDY. We agreed to that. It is not a part of our resolution.
Mr. DIRKSEN. It is a question of customer picketing.
Mr. KENNEDY. That is right. In that case, we have receded on
the question of consumer picketing of a secondary employer.
Now we are going quite far in limiting the right of unions, the traditional right to carry on picketing. And I will say to the Senator that
on the point which he raises we have already agreed to the House
position.0 o

This colloquy, coupled with the analysis of the resolution, seems
to mean that publicity, other than picketing, directed at the
primary employer's product or appealing to consumers not to
trade with a secondary employer who sells products of the primary employer would be permitted. This same question must
have troubled the conferees for the proviso which emerged from
conference cleared up the doubt by expressly providing for "publicity, other than picketing," but making no distinction between
the narrow "product" and the broad "do not trade" appeal."
58. S. Res. 181, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 17333 (1959), 2
LEG. UIsT. 1383.
59. 105 CowG. Rc. 17833 (1959), 2 LEG. HIST. 1383.
60. Id. at 17828, 2 LEG. UIST. 1378.
61. Though not a formal part of the legislative history, the summary of
the proviso's history by Solicitor General, then Professor, Cox, who argued
the principal case before the Supreme Court, and who, while a professor of law,
participated in the conference as an adviser (see the remarks of Senator
Morse, 105 CoNo. Rac. 17867 (1959), 2 LEG. HIST. 1411) provides insight and
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The analysis of this final conference provision, which was
enacted into law, is the most enlightening. Congressman Griffin
reported to the House that the conference had started with the
House bill which "prohibits secondary customer picketing at
retail store which happens to sell product produced by manufacturer with whom union has dispute," and the Senate bill which
contained no provision at all for consumer picketing and had
compromised by leaving the House provision intact "with clarification that other forms of publicity are not prohibited . . . ."
Senator Kennedy reported to the Senate in the following words:
Secondly, the House bill prohibited the union from carrying on any
kind of activity to disseminate informational material to secondary sites.
They could not say that there was a strike in a primary plant.
We quite obviously are opposed to their affecting liberties in a secondary strike or affecting employees joining, but the House language
prohibited not only secondary picketing, but even the handing out of
handbills or even taking out an advertisement in a newspaper.
Under the language of the conference, we agreed there would not
be picketing at a secondary site. What was permitted was the giving
out of handbills or information through the radio, and so forth.63

Continuing his report the following day, he said:
[TJhe Senate conferees insisted that the report secure the following
rights: .
(c) The right to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing asking them to refrain from buying goods made by nonunion labor
and to refrain from trading with a retailer who sells such goods.
Under the Landrum-Griffin bill it would have been impossible for a
union to inform the customers of a secondary employer that that employer or store was selling goods which were made under racket conditions or sweatshop conditions, or in a plant where an economic strike
interesting sidelight. Professor Cox pointed out the possibility that some of
the backers of Landrum-Griffin may not have realized the words of § 8(b)(4) (ii)
were broad enough to include consumer boycotts, but President Eisenhower,
in a television appearance, had described activity which should be proscribed
and his example had to be read as a description of inducing employees through
picketing, or causing a consumer boycott through picketing:
The sponsors of the Landrum-Griffin bill stood immovably upon the
second alternative. The Senate conferees, therefore, sought to narrow
the restriction to the exact illustration used by the President. This is
the reason for the proviso which permits unfair lists, radio broadcasts,
newspaper advertising, sound trucks and every other form of publicity
except picketing, -for the purpose of inducing consumers to boycott
an unfair product or a distributor who does business with an unfair
producer.

Cox, The LandruGrifnsAmendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 MustN. L. REv. 257, 274 (1959).
62. 105 CONG. Ruc. 18022 (1959), 2 LEG. HIST. 1712.
63. Id. at 17790, 2 LEG. ]isT. 1388-89.
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was in progress. We were not able to persuade the House conferees to
permit picketing in front of that secondary shop, but we were able to
persuade them to agree that the union shall 'be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other words, the union can hand
out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can
make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all publicity
short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.64

Senator Morse offered an illustration of the meaning of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in the course of explaining the many reasons why
he could not sign the conference report:
This bill does not stop with threats and with illegalizing the hot cargo
agreement. It also makes it illegal for a union to "coerce, or restrain."
This prohibits consumer picketing. What is consumer picketing? A shoe
manufacturer sells his product through a department store. The employees of the shoe manufacturer go on strike for higher wages. The
employees, in addition to picketing the manufacturer, also picket at
the premises of the department store with a sign saying, "Do not buy
X shoes." This is consumer picketing, an appeal to the public not to
buy the product of a struck manufacturer....
We take a long and backward step when we illegalize consumer
picketing. It is not enough to say that the union can make its appeal
by newspaper advertisements and leaflet distribution. Advertisements
are expensive, and both may be ineffective to quickly and dramatically
catch the public's eye.65

Two references to legislative history are made by the Court but
not included in the foregoing report. Senator McClellan offered
an amendment to section 8(b)(4) forbidding "economic or other
coercion" against any person for a proscribed object. The Court
said he "mentioned consumer picketing but only such as was
'pressure in the form of dissuading customers from dealing with
secondary employers.' "66 It is not at all clear from the context
that Senator McClellan meant to regulate only appeals to consumers to cut off all trade with the secondary employer. He followed the remarks quoted by the Court with a reference to
employers who may have built their entire business around the
product of a single manufacturer. He preceded the quoted words
with the following explanation of his amendment:
The amendment covers the direct coercion of secondary employers
to cause them to cease dealing with or doing business with the primary
64. Id. at 17898-99, 2 LEG. HIST. 1431-32.
65. Id. at 17882-83, 2 LEG. HIST. 1426-27. Mr. Justice Harlan noted
the irony in the fact that Senator Morse used the New York case, Goldfinger
v. Feintuch, in the course of explaining the type of activity struck down by
§ 8(b)(4)(ii), 377 U.S. at 86 n.3, while the majority of the Court cited the
same case, see note 28 supra, as a state precedent recognizing the distinction
announced by the Court.
66. 377 U.S. at 66.
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employer. In other words, if there were a strike in a certain plant, and
I, as a merchant, handled the products of that plant, under the amendment the union could not use picketing to try to compel me to cease
.
handling the products ...

The second reference was to Senator Goldwater, a conferee.
The Court quoted him as explaining that the House bill closed
up every loophole, "'including the use of a secondary consumer
picket line, an example of which the President gave on his nationwide TV program. .. . " The Court then quoted Senator Goldwater's own definition of a consumer boycott and described it
as "even more clearly narrow in scope: 'A secondary consumer,
or customer, boycott involves the refusal of consumers or customers to buy the products or services of one employer in order
to force him to stop doing business with another employer.' ""
This language supports the Court's conclusion only if it is assumed
the speaker intended to provide a literally complete and exclusive
definition of the types of publicity reached by the general language of the provisions in question.
The substance of the Court's opinion consists of interpretation
of the legislative history. Some emphasis is placed on the fact
that initially the legislators sponsoring section 8(b) (4) (ii) did not
spell out the consumer boycott, or at least its precise nature, as
an object of regulation. Senator Morse's remarks were discounted
because opponents of legislation tend to overstate its reach in an
effort to defeat it. This factor would play down the analysis of
Congressmen Udall and Thompson also. But neither observation
is persuasive in the context of the entire legislative history. It is
possible that consumer boycotts were not at the forefront of the
legislators' thoughts when the legislation was first drafted. But
subsequent statements of opponents brought the issue to the
forefront, and there is every indication that the sponsors accepted
the interpretation of the opposition. Indeed, the opposition apparently was quite sincere because a legislative compromise the insertion of the proviso - grew out of common assumptions
as to the meaning of the section if not qualified by the proviso.
The Court interpreted Congressman Griffin's remarks about
consumer picketing as being made "only in the context of its
abuse when directed against shutting off the patronage of a secondary employer."o70 How or why the Court drew this conclusion
67. 105 CONG. REc. 6666 (1959),

9 LEG.

:IST. 1193.

68. 377 US. at 65 n.10. The President's example merely described picketing at a secondary outlet without specifying the object or nature of the
picketing. Ibid.

69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 67.
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is not clear. The only indication of the mental process involved
is a quotation of Congressman Griffin in which the Court supplied italics: "'[O]f course, this bill and any other bill is limited
by the constitutional right of free speech. If the purpose of the
picketing is to coerce the retailernot to do business with the manufacturer' - then such a boycott could be stopped."" Did the
Court interpret the italicized words to mean "coerce the consumer
not to do business with the retailer"? Neither the Court nor the
Court of Appeals questioned the Board's finding in the instant
case that Local 760's object was to pressure the retailer (Safeway)
not to do business with the manufacturer (packers and warehousemen).
Finally, Senator Kennedy's words were to be accounted for.
The Court concluded that his explanation "does not compel the
conclusion that the Conference Agreement contemplated prohibiting any consumer picketing at a secondary site beyond that which
urges the public, in Senator Kennedy's words, to 'refrain from
trading with a retailer who sells such goods.' "72 A more complete
text of Senator Kennedy's words had just been quoted by the
Court: "He said that the proviso preserved 'the right to appeal
to consumers by methods other than picketing asking them to
refrain from buying goods made by non-union labor and to refrain from trading with a retailer who sells such goods ...

.'

"

Mr. Justice Harlan accused the majority of "simply grasping at
straws" by adding emphasis to the word "and," and he suggested
that the word lends itself equally well to a disjunctive meaning.
It is interesting to note in this connection that Senator Kennedy
did use the literal disjunctive conjunction at another point when
describing secondary consumer publicity."
Even more at war with the Court's reliance upon such slender
threads as these is the fact that never in the debates or reports
relied upon was the distinction the Court found, brought home to
the legislators.75 The legislators who provided definitions of consumer boycotts were not alerted to the task of differentiating
categories of consumer boycotts; rather, they spoke very generally with the apparent purpose of isolating the secondary nature
of the activity and the consumer audience as the primary defini71. Id. at 68.
72. Id. at 70.
73. Ibid. A fuller quotation of Senator Kennedy's remarks appears in text
accompanying notes 60, 63, 64 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
75. The remarks of Professor Cox, quoted in note 61 supra, are especially
telling in this respect.

TREE FRUITS

1965]

501

tional criteria. For the Court to seize upon this general, unfocused
language is especially curious when it is remembered that close
scrutiny of legislative history here was peculiarly the child of the
Court's opening assumption: "'In the sensitive area of peaceful
picketing Congress has dealt explicitly with isolated evils which
experience has established flow from such picketing.' ""
The heart of the matter, then, is that Congress had isolated
what it considered to be an unwarranted practice. If the question
of interpretation had been simply whether Congress did or did
not outlaw secondary consumer picketing, an easier case might
have been presented. But the question, rather, was what types of
consumer picketing did Congress regulate if it regulated less than
all. The Court could not find that Congress had not spoken to
the issue, but was forced to find how Congress had defined the
issue.7 7 In this kind of case legislative history cannot be scrutinized with the single negative demand for compelling evidence
that Congress had a given intention. Since the outcome of the
inquiry will be the attribution to Congress of some affirmative
meaning, the search should be undertaken with the object of
determining that meaning. If one goes to the legislative history
to find affirmative support for the interpretation announced by
the Court in Tree Fruits,he will find only a few shreds. This very
absence of support is additional evidence pointing towards the
validity of the competing interpretation.
For these reasons, neither of the policies of clear statement
previously discussed seems equal to the task of relieving the strain
placed upon 8(b)(4)(ii) and its legislative history. To the extent
they played a part in the case, it was in their not unfamiliar role
of diverting attention from the actors with leading parts.
IV. THE SECOND-LOOK DOCTRINE
One other rule of construction might be offered to explain the
result. Professors Bickel and Wellington have suggested a type
of case in which the Court ought to "flout" the legislative will
even though it is unmistakable.7 8 The instances when this will
be justified will of course be rare and grow out of a failure of
76. 377 U.S. at 62-63.
77. In this respect, the problem of interpretation differed from the kind
posed in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), and Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958), where a conclusion that Congress had not regulated to the
extent contended ended the matter.
78. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAav. L. REv. 1 (1957).
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Congress adequately to consider serious "institutional" problems
or invasions of interests occasionally embedded in its legislation.
In carefully defined circumstances where this failure occurs, the
suggestion is that the Court should adopt an interpretation which
will avoid or postpone the effects of the legislation which are
perceived to be troublesome (taking care not to "do anything
that is inconsistent with the English language") ." The interpre-

tation may emasculate the legislation in its intended applications
(this may be the object of the interpretation) since the reason
for ignoring the stated legislative purpose is to stimulate the Congress to take a second look at the legislation in light of the problem disclosed by the Court.
Although it is very doubtful that the authors of this doctrine
would apply it to a case such as Tree Fruits,sothe Court may have
been pursuing a similar idea. If the Court felt that Congress had
regulated a phase of peaceful picketing without adequate consideration, it might see an emasculating interpretation of the
regulation as a suitable remedy. This would explain the emphasis
on legislative history, for only in that history would the extent
and quality of congressional consideration of the problem be
reflected.
Bearing in mind that the suggestion calls for the "flouting" of
clearly expressed legislative purpose, the difficulty with the doctrine, if it has any validity, is in determining when to apply it.
Apparently it is to be applied when a majority of the justices
reasonably conclude that the problem which disturbs them is
sufficiently serious to warrant their refusal to permit the intact
survival of the legislation."' Reasonable men, adhering to the
doctrine, presumably could reach opposite conclusions. If this is
the test, it makes it difficult for one who disagrees with a specific
79. As the title to their article suggests, the authors recommend the application of their rule of construction in connection with Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448 (1957). Believing that J 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958), assigns the wrong task to the wrong institution without due legislative consideration of the probable serious consequences, they would approve of "any
form of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction which does no violence to the statutory language" as a suitable disposition of the Lincoln Mills litigation. Bickel
& Wellington, supra note 78, at 35; see id. at 2-35.
80. The authors distinguish questions of economic policy and accommodations struck between competing interests from "institutional" issues and serious
invasions of personal liberties in discussing types of legislation subject to
their rule. Id. at 26. Tree Fruits arguably can be classified as either type,
however.
81. Ibid.
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application of the doctrine to assert anything more than his
disagreement. But most of the objections which might be raised
to the validity of the doctrine in the abstract are probably resolved by a qualification placed on the doctrine by the authors.
They insist that the Court should be candid in applying the doctrine. Such a requirement would surely provide a safeguard
against frequent usage of the technique, if it could survive at
all. The trouble is, while candor is not too much to ask, it is
probably too much to expect. Application of the doctrine disguised as "interpretation" creates problems more serious, perhaps,
than those the Court might remand to Congress. For if the Court
"speaks in terms of congressional purpose when it is actually
motivated by other constitutional considerations, the Court can
only earn the disrespect of the legal profession and the public."82
This observation retains its validity if the "other considerations"
are nonconstitutional in nature.
If the Court did apply the second-look doctrine or its equivalent in Tree Fruits, it was not candid about it. And if candor
were somehow an enforceable condition precedent to the doctrine's
application, the prediction that the doctrine would not be applied to this piece of labor legislation can be made with some
assurance. Even in the opinion as written, the Court came perilously close to a reversal of roles with Congress through the demand by a general rule that Congress legislate practically on a
case by case basis. Another guideline laid down by the Court
for those who seek to interpret labor legislation may have been
more appropriate in Tree Fruits. In an earlier case dealing with
a problem the reverse of that in Tree Fruits,the Court said:
It is relevant to recall that the Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked
degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in the
free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance to be
struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to
further their respective interests. This is relevant in that it counsels
wariness in finding by construction a broad policy ... when, from the
words of the statute itself, it is clear that those interested in just such
a condemnation were unable to secure its embodiment in enacted law.8 3
82. Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 SAw. L. REV. 208 (1959), in Selected Essays on Constitutional
Law 1938-1962, at 310, 322 (1963). See also Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 20-22 (1964), where the same quotation is referred
to with approval.
83. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 857 U.S. 93, 99-100
(1958).
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CONCLUSION
The reasoning of the opinion in Tree Fruits appears to be
inadequate to support the result reached. The result reached by
the Court will probably not have a substantial impact on labormanagement relations, but this makes the Court's opinion all the
more difficult to understand since the same could be said of the
result reached by the Board. One is at a loss, therefore, to explain
even the values that might respectably be suggested as tending
to offset the debilitating effects of the opinion on the judicial
process. In these terms, no victor emerged in the litigation, for
the loss to all is considerably greater than the temporary gain
for a few.

